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Climate change is a phenomenon leading to randomly distributed disasters around the 
globe. Due to massive economic and technical asymmetry between the advanced North 
and the developing South efficient climate and industrial policy is particular difficult. 
Globally efficient policy would need to equip the South with pollution reducing 
technologies. However, there is a tradeoff between capital accumulation for 
consumption growth and low-carbon development. The pollution stock affecting today’s 
climate was historically accumulated by the North, therefore, the ‘ability-to-pay 
principal’ and the ‘polluter pays principle’ suggest to allocate the main burden of 
climate change policy to the advanced economies.  
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1 Introduction 
In today’s globalized world there is a complex relationship between economic activity 
and the environment. In addition, there is a feedback mechanism from the environment 
to economic activity and welfare. Besides the fact that economic development is a 
driving force for climate change, policies that aim to mitigate global warming may also 
impact negatively on the speed of global development processes. We aim to 
demonstrate that there can be no solution for the problem of global warming on a global 
scale that does not account for the effects that climate policy has on economic 
development, especially for less developed countries. Even more, the causal 
interdependencies are highly asymmetric. Looking at the variety of countries in the 
world, we observe major asymmetries and heterogeneities. There are asymmetries in 
welfare, technology, industry structure, pollution, and the accumulation of a pollution 
stock, and in the way countries are affected by climate change. The effects of these 
asymmetries in the world economy are neither adequately understood nor taken into 
account. This paper seeks to highlight the main effects of the global asymmetries on the 
efficiency of a global climate and industrial policy (IP), and to illustrate the distribution 
problems that arise from such a policy. Since economic theory is well developed with 
respect to environmental economics we can use the associated findings as a starting 
point for analysing the asymmetry issue. 
2 Global  asymmetries   
An important step towards understanding the relationship between economic 
development and global climate policy is to understand the enormous asymmetries and 
heterogeneities in the global economy. We consider the six most important of these. 
2.1  Income: poor versus rich  
It is only possible to comprehend what happens in international talks on climate policy 
and understand the positions of the different countries if one understands the major 
income asymmetries and wealth disparities in the participating countries. Milanovic and 
Yitzhaki (2002) provide a good overview of existing disparities and income inequalities 
in the global economy. Table 1 shows these disparities using mean income, Gini-
coefficients and the overlapping index. A simple comparison of the mean incomes in 
this table reveals that at the beginning of this century, three-quarters of the world’s 
population earned less than 10 per cent of the richest 16 per cent of the world’s 
population.  
Only 16 per cent of the world’s population live in the rich countries.1 They produce and 
enjoy 58 per cent of world income. By contrast, 76 per cent of the world’s population 
live in poor countries and generate only 29 per cent of world income. During the last 
150 years of growth the richest 16 per cent of the world’s population were able to 
accumulate an estimated share of over 80 per cent of the world’s wealth. In other words, 
these 16 per cent own the main share of real world capital and in turn most of the 
                                                 
1  According to Milanovic and Yitzhaki (2002) this group consists of the G7 or G7-equivalent states, the 
latter having at least the per capita income of the G7.    2
world’s firms and corporations. This affluent population group also participates in 60 
per cent of international trade and an even greater proportion of international financial 
transactions. So on the one hand, the richest 16 per cent of today’s population have been 
able to generate the technological and economic growth that has led to progress in 
human development, but also to the major disparities we observe today. On the other 
hand, even if the disparities in per capita income remain drastic, absolute economic 
activity, which can be an indicator for political power, indeed shows that the developing 
world has not only started to grow more rapidly, but has already undergone a 
considerable catching-up process. These developments described in Figures 1 to 3 have 
clear effects on the functioning and mechanisms of global governance. Because most of 
the economically successful countries are in the northern hemisphere we refer to these 
countries as the rich North2, in contrast to the poor South3. To simplify the discussion 
we do not take all countries into account but rather focus on the G20 states. The G20 
represent by far the largest share of global economic activity, and using them we can 
demonstrate the asymmetries in the world most vividly. Hence, we split the G20 group 
into Northern and Southern countries.  
Looking at Figures 1 to 3 it becomes apparent that the North is no longer the by far 
dominant part of the world economy. The world economy faces a ‘global shift’4 in 
relative weights with important effects on both, the North and the South. The reasons 
for these differences in development are complex and go far beyond the scope of this 
paper. Nevertheless, identifying these enormous heterogeneities and asymmetries is a 
prerequisite for understanding the global climate debate and the various positions taken 
by the countries in developing an appropriate policy.  
2.2  Industry structure: physical production versus value added in services  
Income disparity is not the only factor to contribute to the range of positions and 
conclusions when negotiating a global environmental, industrial, and climate policy. 
Equally important are asymmetries in industry structure. Per capita income in the South 
accelerated thanks to rapid modernization and structural change. There is no sustainable 
development process that is not directly connected with a structural shift away from 
agriculture towards the modern industrial or service sector. Indeed, there is an ongoing 
debate about the role of industrialization in the process of development. Some evidence 
for Latin America and Africa seem to indicate even a process of deindustrialization 
since the 1980s. A direct shift from an agriculture-dominated towards a service-driven 
economy seems possible. However, the most impressive development processes, 
particularly in Asia, are fuelled by massive industrialization and hence an expanding 
industrial sector. Comparative advantages in labour-intensive, standardized production 
processes clearly point less at the importance of the service sector, but at a rapid 
expanding manufacturing industry within an internationally-oriented outward-looking 
development strategy. Due to the emergence of industrial sectors in the South and a 
shift in comparative advantages between the South and the North a large part of today’s 
                                                 
2  The rich countries of the G20, or the North, are the USA, Germany, Japan, the UK, France, Italy, 
Canada, and Australia.  
3  The poor countries of the G20, or the South, are China, Brazil, Russia, India, South Korea, Mexico, 
Turkey, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and Argentina. 
4  For a more detailed discussion of this shift in the global economy, see Gries (2007).    3
global industrial production takes place in the South. However, industrialization in the 
South is beneficial not only for the successful emerging markets, the North also benefits 
via international trade. Many of the goods produced in the South are eventually 
consumed in the North. Northern consumers benefit in particular from low prices which 
increase real purchasing power in the North. In other words, the development process 
undergone by the South also affects the North very positively.  
However, international integration has led to acceleration in the economic division of 
production processes all over the world. The late take-off of developing economies, and 
the process of industrialization that goes along with development, means that 
developing countries are currently passing through the stages of industrialization that 
advanced economies went through long ago. Typically this process begins with a 
massive expansion of industrial production. Value added is created in the shape of 
physical production using standardized technologies and labour-intensive production 
processes. As products become more complex and sophisticated technologies become 
commonplace, the value adding processes change. The proportion of standardized 
physical production declines in favour of high value adding high quality services. This 
represents yet another structural change, which brings with it another substantial change 
in resource-intensity. Whereas physical production during the first phase of 
industrialization is characterized by high resource- and energy-intensity, we observe 
declining resource- and energy-intensity in advanced countries as technology and 
human capital intensity increases.  
Generally speaking, the stage of development at any one time partly determines (a) the 
production structure and in turn (b) resource and energy intensity. This has two 
implications for the current negotiations on a global climate policy. First, high-income 
countries are fortunate enough to no longer have a dominant physical industrial 
production sector. In these countries the less energy intensive service sector is 
responsible for about 70 per cent of value added, so they have a production structure 
with high energy and resource efficiency. Second, since emerging economies are in the 
relatively early stages of development their production structures are undergoing 
increasing physical industrialization. The success of these countries is driven by the fact 
that they are responsible for a rising share of the world’s physical production. Their 
development is an industrialization process driven by the alignment of their production 
structures with their comparative advantages. Thus the North-South structural 
asymmetry is the result of international integration and a successful, export-driven 
development strategy.5 Whereas in the North successful development goes hand in hand 
with ongoing deindustrialization and a growing technology and service sector, the South 
is growing through industrial modernization.  
2.3  Technologies: high tech versus backward technology  
The third considerable asymmetry relates to the technological differences between the 
North and the South and partly to the developmental asymmetries mentioned above. 
There are enormous technological differences between the North and the South in all 
dimensions and areas of economic activity. In addition to the structural advantages of 
the industry of the North (with a less energy-intensive structure), energy efficiency in 
                                                 
5  On developmental and catching-up processes, international integration, and structural changes see 
also, Gries (1995) and Gries and Jungblut (1997a; 1997b).   4
the North (with the exception of the USA) is far better than in the South. In this section 
we focus on the differences in the use of fossil energy resources.  
Figure 4 illustrates this difference. Germany and Japan are two examples of Northern 
countries with high efficiency in avoiding pollution. China is an example of a Southern 
emerging economy with low energy-efficiency, while the USA stands for a rich and 
developed country with the efficiency in avoiding pollution of a developing economy. 
CO2 emissions per unit of output in the North are far lower than in the South for two 
reasons. First, higher per capita income in the North seems to influence the preferences 
towards a cleaner environment. Second, this shift in preferences encourages the 
development of technologies that reduce pollution from production processes. Energy-
efficient technologies are in demand. In particular, more efficient electrical power plants 
are leading to a significant reduction in pollutant emissions. While technologies with 
low CO2 emissions are available, most of them are implemented only in the North and 
hence asymmetrically. Even if many of these technologies were developed with high 
public subsidies, property rights are often privatized. Today, most of these technologies 
are owned by private firms in the North. These asymmetries in availability and 
ownership have to be taken into account as well when negotiating a global climate 
policy. 
2.4  Current pollution emissions  
The fourth global asymmetry is based on the differences in economic development and 
emissions efficiency. As shown in Figure 5a most of today’s global pollution is 
generated by the two country groups under review. On the one hand, there are the rich 
countries of the North; on the other, there are the emerging economies of the South. 
Interestingly, in Figure 5a we can observe that since 2005 the emerging markets have 
contributed more pollution than the Northern countries.  
However, for both country groups it is clear that pollution is linked to the level of 
economic activity. A high absolute level of economic activity leads to a high absolute 
level of pollution. Because the advanced countries still account for the largest absolute 
share in world production they still have high pollution, despite their structural 
advantages. This becomes especially apparent when we convert absolute pollution to 
per capita pollution. Thus most of today’s global pollution is due to income and welfare 
generating activities in the rich countries, even though some successful emerging 
countries like China, India, and Indonesia do contribute a considerable amount of 
pollution. 
2.5  Historical pollution (pollution stock)  
These asymmetries in pollution become even more dramatic if we not only consider 
today’s pollution flows but also the pollution that has accumulated over time. Figure 5b 
displays current accumulated pollution levels that are responsible for global warming. 
Although the emerging markets are catching up fast and generate a noteworthy amount 
of pollution themselves, most of today’s pollution can be traced back to more than two-
thirds of the Northern countries. Hence some of today’s prosperity and wealth in the 
advanced countries has been virtually paid for with global pollution and global 
warming. Assuming inter-generational responsibility is an accepted principle, the 
Northern countries ought to—and owing to their prosperity, are able to—contain the 
damage they have caused in an adequate way. This basic consideration becomes even   5
more drastic when absolute values are converted to per capita values. As is shown in 
Figure 7, not only is the North by far the biggest polluter in absolute terms, but these 
countries are also the greatest beneficiaries in terms of the use of fossil resources for the 
sake of wealth development, expressed in accumulated per capita pollution. 
2.6  Natural disasters and resulting damage  
The final asymmetry affects the vulnerability of the North and South to future climate 
change-induced effects. Of all the asymmetries discussed above this is the most 
theoretical one, in particular because to this day we have no reliable forecasts 
concerning the impact of global warming on different regions in the North and South. 
There are some clear indications of growing desertification, a rising number of extreme 
weather events and an increase in weather-related disasters. There are also indications 
that sea levels are rising and that ocean currents may shift, yet all of these statements 
involve so much uncertainty and coincidence that it is impossible to make stylized 
predictions. Statements about potential exposure vary depending on the likelihood of 
that exposure, ranging from the predominant exposure of the Southern countries (in 
particular because of their proximity to the equator and the resulting desertification 
issues and extreme weather conditions) to a rising vulnerability of Northern countries 
(for example due to changes in the great marine conveyor belt causing extreme weather 
and wind phenomena). In this regard, there are asymmetries in both regions. Which of 
these asymmetries will occur or whether there will be any asymmetries at all is 
completely unclear, as it stands today. Maybe this uncertainty about the future 
symmetric or asymmetric exposure offers the greatest chance of reaching an agreement. 
As for the cost of global climate change-induced damage, Stern (2006) assumes that it 
equates to between 5 and 11 per cent of global GDP each year.  
3  Climate change and the global efficiency problem  
Since using the environment as an absorbent for pollution affects welfare and quality of 
life, pollution-producing activities have to be closely monitored. To consider the 
environment as a resource implies an economization of the environment. The economic 
objective is to find a reasonable, ideally even an optimal, way to manage this resource 
in order to improve global welfare. How can we manage the ‘environment resource’ in 
the best possible way? So far the global climate policy debate has not appropriately 
tackled the issue of global efficiency and global fairness, in particular with regard to the 
strong North-South asymmetry. While references to the asymmetries between these are 
made once in a while, they do not form part of a comprehensive proposal for global 
policy implementation.6 
To solve the problem of finding a global environmental policy for an asymmetric world, 
special consideration must be given to two characteristics that arise from the use of the 
environment as a resource. The first one is the global ‘public good characteristic’ of 
CO2 pollution. Emissions, no matter where they are produced, cause global warming 
which can potentially affect everyone. Hence, pollution causes damage for potentially 
everyone and correspondingly also reduces universal wealth. Second, pollution 
                                                 
6  For a comparison of different proposals, see, for example, Agrawala (2005) and OECD (2009a; 
2009b).   6
accumulates to become a more and more serious problem. The enormous pollution 
stock accumulated slowly over time has created today’s global warming problems.  
These two characteristics have to be taken into consideration when finding ways to treat 
the current emissions problems effectively. In the following we will describe some 
stylized thoughts that may lead to a more efficient solution of the pollution stock 
problem that is causing climate change. We will do so in two steps. In the first step we 
assume a homogeneous world: our approach towards the problem of developing an 
efficient environmental policy involves ‘assuming away’ all the asymmetries in the 
global economy as described in Section 2, an experiment that will shed light on the 
fundamental and economically useful aspects of a global environmental policy. In a 
second step we consider the existing asymmetries in the global economy. We identify 
the special challenges of an asymmetric world, again within a stylized discussion, with 
the aim of illustrating a global environmental policy under asymmetric conditions.  
All lines of argumentation are based on the model described in the next section and the 
version of this model of a asymmetric world is given in the Appendix.  
3.1  A simple global pollution stock model in a homogeneous world 
This contribution cannot claim to present a fully developed model for an optimal global 
policy with asymmetric world regions. However, what it can do is to outline an optimal 
environmental policy in a homogeneous world and in the Appendix, present a first 
extension of this model for the asymmetric world.  
In this first reference model7 we assume that these asymmetries do not exist. There are 
no differences between agents, technologies, or countries. Hence we assume a 
representative agent consuming C from world production. Pollution causes damage all 
over the world. This damage E enters the agent’s utility function causing disutilities U 
(C,E). Hence welfare W of the society, including future generations, is defined as  
 
Environmental damage E is generated by two components: the consumption of fossil 
energy resources R and the existing state (stock) of pollution A.  
 
World product Q is produced using the flow of extracted exhaustible energy resources R 
and accumulated capital K. Since environmental damage E is a negative public good it 
also affects the production process as a negative externality.  
 
                                                 
7  As a starting point this simple model is closely based on the standard descriptions of this problem 
given in e.g. Perman et al. (2003: chapter 16). Further theoretic models are presented by Farzin (1996) 
and Lieb (2004). 
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while pollution causes damage, there is also a clean-up technology F. While the 
production technology determines how efficiently resources are used, the clean-up 
technology reduces existing damage. With V being the cost of applying the clean-up 
technology, we improve the effectiveness of this technology by spending more 
 
The effects of economic activity on resource stocks S and accumulated pollution R are  
 
and for exhaustible resources  
 
As for stock pollution dynamics we assume that stock pollution changes as a function of 
the current use of resources   less the natural regeneration rate indicated by rate   
and less the effects of the clean-up technology F .  
The model is closed by considering the budget constraint for the representative agent 
 
To solve this problem we use optimal control theory as described in Appendix 1. From 
the first order condition concerning resource use we obtain the efficient price path as  
      ( 1 )  
where P
net is the net price that corrects for negative externalities of resource use to 
obtain an efficient allocation of resources. We discuss the message of this efficiency 
condition in the following section.  
In Figure 6 we see the price path for a fossil resource causing flow and stock pollution 
effects. The fact that the resource is exhaustible and not easy to completely substitute 
leads to a generally rising price. However, the damage caused by the pollution requires 
a price adjustment to reduce the use of the resource and cut down the damage. There are 
two flow externalities, one damage affects consumers and another producers. For both 
effects a price correction could reduce the damage towards and efficient use of the 
resource. A third effect is the one generated by the accumulated stock of pollution. 
Since the accumulated stock of pollution together with today’s additional pollution 
causes further future negative effects this stock pollution effect also requires a price 
correction. 
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3.2  A global environmental policy in a homogeneous world  
Based on the theoretical concept discussed in the previous section we now discuss a 
world with no differences between North and South. In this world, wealth is positively 
affected by consumption and negatively affected by pollution both pollution flows and 
pollution stocks already accumulated. In this model the pollution comes from burning 
fossil fuels to generate electricity. Hence they are major factors of production. If 
burning fossil resources is necessary for production, on the one hand, but generates 
welfare-reducing pollution on the other, one can find an optimal level of use. From 
equation (1) in the above model we learn that under free market conditions the resource 
is used too intensively and the pollution caused by burning fossil resources is too high. 
Figure 6 shows the theoretical price path of the resource that arises without an 
environmental policy, as well as the efficient price path that should be taken via policy 
instruments to guarantee efficient resource use.  
The condition reflects well-established insights from the economics of externalities and 
public goods. First, Figure 6 shows that the gross price ought to increase by the 
marginal values of all three kinds of damage, namely the direct marginal effect on 
utility [ ], the marginal negative effect on production [ ], and the marginal 
stock pollution effect of accumulating CO2 that negatively affects the next generation [
]. Second, the resulting net price should determine resource use in production 
and—with an increasing net price—adjust total extraction and the burning of fossil 
resources downwards. Third, there are various instruments that can be used to 
implement this price adjustment. The best-known policies are the Pigou tax (an eco 
tax)8 and tradable permits.9 Both instruments lift the price so that resource inputs and 
damage are reduced.10 
In a world with no differences and asymmetries where policy instruments are 
enforceable by a governmental authority, a global environmental policy would not be 
much of a problem. In fact, there are many examples of countries where such 
environmental problems have been solved.11 However, not much theoretical modelling 
has been done so far concerning highly asymmetric countries.12  
3.3  A global environmental policy in an asymmetric world 
In the asymmetric world described above the policy conditions are fundamentally 
different. The theoretical approach underlying the following discussion extends the 
above model (see Appendix 2). As it primarily serves to understand the different 
perspectives and the associated factors that strongly influence the optimization problem, 
we have not yet tried to suggest a global optimal policy strategy. Our objective is to 
                                                 
8  The idea of internalizing external effects of public goods goes back to Pigou (1920). His approach was 
later extended in the context of environmental economics by Baumol and Oates (1971, 1988). 
9  See, for example, Dales (1968), Cansier (1996), and Dorn (1996). 
10 For a comparison see e.g. Giraudet and Quirion (2008) or Oikonomou et al. (2008). For accumulated 
pollution see also the discussion in Hoela and Karp (2002). 
11 See, for example, Christiansen et al. (2005) or Convery (2009). 
12 See, for example, Rose et al. (1998). 
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suggest a starting point to address the issue rather than to provide a comprehensive 
solution.  
To include the impact of global asymmetries on decision-making from different 
perspectives we assume that there are two separate world regions, the North and the 
South. Each of these regions constitutes its own world in which it produces, consumes, 
and develops independently. The central link between these two world regions is the 
effect of pollution. Pollution, both accumulated (stock) and current pollution (flow), 
impacts negatively on welfare in the whole world, in the South as much as in the North. 
To focus on the problem of pollution and to identify an efficient global solution, the 
only asymmetry between the North and the South, is the technological capability of 
avoiding pollution when using fossil resources. The existing pollution-reducing 
technologies in the North mean that this region generates significantly less pollution 
with the same resource input. Even if the North produces heavy pollutant emissions due 
to a high level of production and income, the marginal efficiency of pollution per 
resource and per output unit is significantly higher in the North. From this simple 
asymmetry13 we can already draw some early conclusions concerning an efficient 
control of polluting resources and an efficient environmental policy. From the very 
simple model in Appendix 2 we can derive environmental uncoordinated policies of the 
North and the South, respectively, or if acting coordinated and simultaneously. The first 
and most important principle of an efficient policy is: pollution reduction has to start 
where it can be achieved most easily (with the lowest possible marginal opportunity 
costs). As more and more pollution is reduced, pollution-reducing technologies will 
become more and more expensive (decreasing marginal efficiency), so we have to begin 
with the technologies that are the most effective. Since the technologies used in the 
South have low energy efficiency we have to begin in the South because here maximum 
reductions are possible with very little investment, whereas the North would incur very 
high expenditures to improve what are already efficient technologies. From a global 
point of view the most efficient measure is to implement efficiency-improving 
technologies until the South has reached the level of marginal resource efficiency of the 
North. Looking at this efficiency condition says nothing about the issue of bearing the 
burden of implementation costs. We discuss the question of burdens and their fair 
distribution in Section 4. To make our point as clearly as possible we separate the two 
issues, efficiency and fair distribution at this stage, initially focusing solely on 
efficiency before coming back to the problem of fair distribution later.  
How can a global government execute this kind of efficient environmental policy? From 
our theoretical model in Appendix 2 it is apparent that the inefficient use of resources in 
the South has to become more expensive, relative to the North, until marginal 
environmental damage reaches the same level. Rising prices would be an incentive for 
preventing damage until an equal efficiency level in the North and South is reached. 
This relative price increase can be implemented theoretically via a Pigou tax or an 
optimal number of tradable permits. In any case these instruments would be a necessary 
incentive for implementing resource-saving technologies. Further, thinking about 
implementing resource-efficient technologies in the South requires a more detailed 
                                                 
13 In reality asymmetries are even more complex. Further interdependencies like trade (e.g. Bommer and 
Schulze (1999) and Neary (2006) would not simplify the problem.   10
insight into the characteristics of pollution-reducing technologies that partly already 
exist in the North. We can distinguish three cases.  
1.  The technology of the North is a blueprint technology, i.e. it is an improvement 
in efficiency due to a pure increase in expertise. The implementation of this 
expertise allows for high reduction of emissions in the production process at no 
cost. A first straightforward example for this kind of efficiency improvements is 
a simple increasing awareness of environmental inefficiency. Preventing waste 
of resources is an easy step towards a de facto more efficient technology. 
Another example of such a blueprint technology could be a simple filtering 
technology where the chemical composition and engineering of the filter, and 
not the expensive components of filter production, generate the filter effect. The 
physical components of the filter demand no serious resource input. Hence, the 
value of this technology is solely generated through the knowledge of filter 
engineering expertise. It could be freely available or protected by a patent that 
generates license fees.  
2.  A  s e c o n d  k i n d  o f  t e c h n o l o g y  w o u l d  b e  s i m i l a r  t o  t h e  f i r s t ,  e x c e p t  i t s  
implementation would incur major costs. These could consist of potential license 
fees, but also of set-up and installation costs. These costs need to be considered 
when evaluating efficient policy instruments.  
3.  The third case involves a technology embodied in real capital. In this case the 
production process requires a substitution of the presently implemented real 
capital by another more energy efficient capital stock with an integrated energy-
saving technology. Under these conditions, not only would a power plant need 
filters in its smokestacks, it would also have to make major changes to the power 
generation process and hence replace a substantial share of the existing capital. 
Pollution could only be reduced as intended with massive investments in 
physical capital.  
Depending on the empirical relevance of these three cases the design of environmental 
and industrial policies need to take account of various aspects. Further, as the three 
scenarios imply very different financial requirements, the issues of global efficiency and 
the fair distribution of burdens are affected in different ways.  
1. Environmental and industrial policy based on a blueprint technology: this scenario 
would be the simplest and affect the cost and distribution issue the least. As this kind of 
technology would imply no rivalry in usage the only problem is the appropriate 
treatment of property rights of the technology owner. A blueprint technology that is 
used in one power plant can be simultaneously used in any number of other power 
plants without resource rivalry. As this kind of technology is characterized as a ‘public 
good’ it can be used simultaneously by several users with almost no direct costs. The 
optimal policy strategy in this case is for the ‘global government’ to pay appropriate 
compensation to the technology owner and supply the technology to the world for free. 
Like a public good, this technology would be available to all potential polluters at no 
cost. This would have a maximum impact on potential sources of pollution. The details 
of financing the appropriate compensation would have to be negotiated between the 
North, the likely owner of this technology, and the South. The result of these 
negotiations is not part of the efficiency problem, but a part of the distribution problem 
discussed below. The efficiency problem would be solved through deprivatization in the 
North and the transformation of a privately-owned technology to a global public good.    11
2. Blueprint technologies with considerable implementation costs: the second case links 
the extremely positive characteristic of a ‘public good technology’ with the problem that 
in reality this technology is not available for free. Even if emissions filters were 
available at virtually no cost, installation and adjustments in the power plants would 
require a more or less considerable amount of resources. Hence a considerable 
investment would be required to implement a low-carbon economy. The 
implementation costs alone would lead to investment activity and capital accumulation 
that is not directed towards the output of private goods. In this respect industrial policies 
may face a partial trade-off between implementing low-carbon technologies and a 
resource allocation promoting a higher speed of capital accumulation. Hence these 
investments would conflict with other development goals like growth in private goods. 
Depending on who provides the resources, the North or the South, one party would have 
to carry a burden.  
First, collecting these resources in the South would slow down private output growth 
due to a slowdown in capital accumulation. Resources allocated to pollution-reducing 
technologies simultaneously reduce the funds available for investment in classic 
production processes. Hence the speed of capital accumulation for private production 
and in turn, the speed of development, decelerates. Because Southern countries are poor 
and have a huge backlog in development this would conflict with the United Nations’ 
Millennium Development Goals.  
Second and alternatively, resources could be collected in the North leading to a real 
North to South transfer. Even if the necessary investment goods or implementation 
services were purchased in the North, which would positively affect production and 
employment in the North, funds still have to be raised. For a real North to South transfer 
taxes have to be levied in the North leading to a reduction in disposable income and 
consumption. Put simply, the North needs to raise taxes to buy resource-efficient 
investment goods from its own economy and send these goods to Southern countries.  
Obviously, implementation costs lead to a reduction in private consumption in the South 
or the North. So aside from the ideal case of a technology that is one hundred per cent a 
public good, climate protection clearly generates costs. However, these burdens are the 
opportunity cost of the gains we obtain by curbing global warming. These opportunity 
costs are the reasonable (and efficient) investment that is necessary to prevent damage 
through global warming. Both the South and the North have to develop an awareness 
that these costs exist and that it is necessary to distribute the burdens in an efficiently 
organized global economy. 
3. The technology is a substantial part of the capital good: this third scenario is the 
most difficult one. Here, the technology cannot be installed within the existing capital 
stock. The technology is directly embodied in capital goods, and hence the current 
capital stock cannot be upgraded. Countries need to build a completely new or a 
supplementary capital stock with the adequate pollution-efficient technologies. 
Theoretically this is comparable to scenario 2. The difference is that implementation 
costs are not just small once and for all flows of payment, but require a substitution of 
existing capital by a long-term accumulation of a new and presumably even higher 
valued capital stock. Industrial and environmental policies face an even more serious 
trade-off between fast consumption growth and low-carbon production. Again, who is 
capable of bearing this even greater burden? If the South mobilizes these resources, 
traditional production and development processes would be affected and the South   12
would sustain a slowdown in consumption. Similar effects would occur in the North if 
there were a real transfer from North to South. For a real resource transfer the Northern 
governments, similar to scenario 2 above, would have to raise taxes in order to fund the 
efficient investment goods even if they were produced in the North. Raising taxes would 
reduce private income in the North and hence negatively influence the consumption 
path in the North. Nevertheless, this would increase welfare because the installation of 
pollution-efficient capital stocks in the South would overcompensate for the costs of 
global warming despite impacting on the current consumption path.  
While this discussion makes clear that an efficient solution to the global climate 
problem is possible, it also emerges that a reallocation of resources is necessary and that 
there is extreme uncertainty with respect to estimating total costs and benefits and the 
distribution of these benefits and burdens. For example assuming that the introduction 
of a global carbon market could keep the temperature increase below 3°C, this policy 
would, according to OECD estimates, cost about 0.1 per cent of average global GDP 
growth between 2012 and 2050.14 According to the UNFCCC (2007) investments of 
more than US$200 billion are necessary each year in order to maintain global 
greenhouse gas emissions at current levels until 2030. Even if the total value seems 
huge, this amount is less than US$1 per day for each citizen of the North. The 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change estimates these costs to be around 3 per 
cent of world GDP (IPCC 2007).15  
Closely connected to the required resources is a finance problem16 which incorporates a 
large-scale conflict concerning the distribution of burdens. Therefore, we have tried to 
make clear that in addition to the issue of an efficient solution any policy strategy that 
aims to solve the global efficiency problem necessarily has to ensure a fair distribution 
of burdens. This holds as long as a reduction in global warming is linked by 
technological characteristics to a reduction of the classic consumption path, and no ideal 
and freely accessible public good blueprint technology is available. IP must be aware of 
the fact that low-carbon growth is not for free. Hence it is important to realize that, even 
though our model treats them separately, both problems—efficiency and a fair 
distribution of burdens—are closely linked 
4  A fair distribution of burdens  
Solving the efficiency problem will most likely incur substantial implementation and 
even accumulating investment costs. Therefore, we also have to answer the question of 
how to distribute these burdens fairly.17 Finding a response to this is particularly 
difficult because there are two components to consider. First, there is no global 
government that is able to decide on any kind of reasonable policy strategy on a global 
scale, let alone implement such a strategy effectively. So far most discussions about 
                                                 
14 See, OECD (2009b). 
15 See, Ott et al. (2009: 11). 
16 For a discussion on finance see, for example, Ott et al. (2009) and Harmeling et al. (2009). 
17 Suggestions are discussed e.g. in Harmeling et al. (2009).   13
implementation have focused on policies within countries.18 Second, the considerable 
asymmetries and heterogeneities in the world, as described in Section 2, make it even 
harder to decide what constitutes a ‘fair’ distribution of burdens. Both of these points 
are hardly discussed in the present debate, even if they are crucial to finding an effective 
solution. Since our paper focuses on asymmetries we place the distribution problem, 
which is an intra- and an inter-generational problem, at the centre of the debate.  
The intra-generational distribution problem: there are huge global disparities in the 
current level of development and consumption. The UN has stated clear goals 
concerning the elimination of poverty and the promotion of development in developing 
countries. Assuming these are common goals for the benefit of the global population, 
then it must be determined which principle of distribution can best achieve them.  
1. According to the ability-to-pay principle a major share of burden would have to be 
carried by the North. If this principal is applied the much higher income per capita of 
the North would suggest to allocate a substantial share of burdens to the North. This 
would mean a tax increase in the North and a transfer in favour of Southern countries.  
2. According to the principle of equal distribution a worldwide tax per head would have 
to be levied under the assumption that everyone is affected in the same way. However, 
in reality this would not be feasible because most of the population would not be 
capable of paying this tax due to their low income. Further, it would blatantly violate 
the ability-to-pay principle.  
3. The third possibility is the polluter pays principle, under which the producer of the 
pollution is expected to pay. The North would be most affected by this because it still 
produces high emissions in absolute terms. However, the South would also be affected 
since it includes successful emerging markets like China, India, Indonesia, and Brazil 
(Figure 5a). When calculating a measure of per capita equality—which seems 
reasonable—the burden on the South would decrease significantly, because in per capita 
terms the North still emits far more pollution than the South (Figure 7a). The burden on 
the South would drop further if we account for decreasing marginal utility of 
consumable income, as is often done in economic models (see Appendix 2). In this 
context the marginal utility of consumption in the South would be substantially higher 
due to its lower per capita income. Hence the opportunity costs of tax burdens are much 
higher in the South than in the North. This, too, would lead to a clear and considerable 
additional burden on the North compared to that on the South.  
So far we have only discussed fair distribution in the context of current emissions and 
the current world population, that is, we have looked at conditions within a generation. 
The phrase ‘fair distribution’ has another important dimension, namely inter-
generational distribution. Looking at the emissions stocks in Figure 5b this dimension 
becomes very obvious. The model, which is described in the Appendix, has been 
deliberately chosen as an emissions stock accumulating model. The current level of 
global warming has evolved almost entirely through accumulated pollution generated in 
the past in the North. Only 20 per cent of today’s accumulated pollution can be traced 
back to China and other Southern countries. This becomes even more obvious when 
                                                 
18 See, OECD (2009a), even if OECD (2009b) incorporates the possibilities of international cooperation 
and assistance and no global coordinated programmes are discussed.   14
looking at accumulated pollution per capita (Figure 7b). Hence today’s need for action 
can be almost solely attributed to past activities in the North. Even if an efficient 
solution of the whole problem is not possible without incorporating the South, the issue 
of fair intergenerational distribution plays a major role when examining the fair 
distribution of burdens in the shape of investment in climate protection. While past 
generations in the North were able to pollute at no costs and in turn undergo 
development without any regard for emissions and the resulting burden on future 
generations, the South, while still underdeveloped, may now be held liable for 
additional damage prevention. Therefore, current global asymmetries, but also 
intergenerational asymmetry, will be important components in the debate surrounding a 
strategy for a global low-carbon economy. 
5 Conclusions   
The search for a global climate protection policy is a central economic problem. An 
efficient global strategy that incorporates a fair distribution of burdens is needed. In this 
respect an essential problem of searching for an efficient and fair climate and IP is the 
massive economic and technical asymmetry between the rich advanced North and the 
mostly less developed poor South. 
The first and most important aspect of an efficient climate and IP is that pollution 
reduction has to start where it can be carried out most effectively (with a minimum of 
resources). If the highest pollution reduction can be achieved in a developing or 
emerging country with low resource input, then a global strategy should invest in these 
countries first. It is far more difficult and expensive to continue improving the already 
efficient technologies of the North. From a global point of view the most efficient 
measure would be to equip the South with efficiency-improving technologies until such 
time as similar marginal efficiency levels have been reached. Policy makers also have to 
be aware that there is a trade-off between the speed of general capital accumulation for 
the speed of consumption growth and low-carbon development. A global low-carbon 
growth path is most likely not for free.  
Hence, a globally fair distribution of the burden generated by these investments is the 
most serious problem. Because most of the historically accumulated total pollution that 
affects today’s climate has been caused by the North, the ability-to-pay principle and the 
polluter pays principle would allocate the main burden to the advanced Northern 
economies.  
In a way this is an academic discussions, some weeks ago, my family watched the news 
and my children saw pictures of a great flood in Pakistan and asked if this flood has to 
do with climate change. ‘We don’t know exactly, but may be’, was my answer. Then, 
they asked, ‘what could be done to stop it?’ I said ‘spend US$200 billion per year on 
low-carbon emission technologies’. ‘What does that mean?’ they asked, and I answered, 
‘An ice cream a day for each of us’. They looked surprised and said ‘That is easy …’. 
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Appendix 1 
Optimal price path: homogeneous world 
A global government or representative agent solves the optimal control problem:  
Present value Hamilton 
 
F.O.C. 









A simple model of global pollution and environmental policy (with asymmetric 
dynamics of pollution) 
Only a small number of papers have considered heterogeneous regions with respect to 
stocks of accumulated pollution. For a discussion see, for example, Xabadia, Goetz, and 
Zilberman (2005, 2008) or Hoel and Karp (2009). For a better illustration we introduce 
a simple model. 
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Representative agents in two world regions 
The world consists of two regions. On the one hand there is the technologically 
developed North with high income; on the other there is the technologically backward 
South with low levels of income. Both regions produce and consume separately. The 
only good that is used by both sides is the shared environment (atmosphere). Hence we 
have two representative agents, one that consumes the Southern product and another 
that consumes the Northern product. Environmental pollution is global and the resulting 
environmental damage E has to be borne by both sides. 
 
Welfare in both regions (when considering future generations) is  
 
Environmental damage 
Local environmental damage arises from the local use of fossil resources and is linked 
to the existing level of environmental damage A. Because the North has better 
technologies it is assumed that the North pollutes less than the South. To simplify the 
model this differential can be interpreted such that the North emits no pollution at all 
while the South does. Even if this is clearly not the case in reality, this extreme scenario 




Aggregated good Q is produced with exhaustible resource R and accumulated capital K. 
Asymmetric conditions are reflected in the production process. While the filter 
technologies of the North will, in extreme cases, have no direct negative impact on their 
own local production, the locally produced environmental damage in the South will 
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Damage removal technologies 
Damage removal is not damage prevention. While damage prevention technologies 
directly prevent damage in the first place, local technologies for damage removal F
i are 
capable of reducing already existing damage. Because the North does not create damage 
in our model it does not need any damage removal technologies. Because VN represents 
the costs of damage protection, damage reduction improves with more effort. 












Resource stocks and pollution stocks 
Resource stocks S decrease with extraction and usage as a factor of production R.  
 
 
Pollution stocks (e.g. CO2) change with pollution through current usage M
S (R) less 
natural reduction through regeneration at the rate of regeneration α and less the reduced 
damage from damage removal technologies. 
 
Restricted consumer budgets 
As both regions are completely separate with the exception of a shared environment 
(shared pollution) they also make their own decisions with respect to accumulation and 
consumption. 
 
The optimal control problem and solution 
Present value Hamiltonian 
North and South are completely separate with only one common problem (variable), 
namely shared pollution. 
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From these first-order conditions we can develop optimal policy strategies for each 
problem. This should especially be done for the price path of the resource. An optimal 
solution for the whole system is identified in three steps. 
Price path in the North and in South without considering pollution  
Bear in mind that we assume that the North emits no pollution at all (unrealistically) in 
order to point out the effects of the asymmetries. 
 
 
Price path when only considering the South 
 
 
Price path from a global point of view, optimal pricing for the world 
 
 
One world policy could be a Pigou tax which would only be levied on the resources 
used by the polluting South. This tax covers the components 
However, this price segmentation is a considerable incentive for illegal arbitrage 
(smuggling) which in turn can only be prevented at high cost. A smuggle-free 
alternative could be a tax levied at source on resource extraction. Under this system the 
North, too, would pay the efficient resource price of the South. The result would be that 
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the price charged in the North would be too high, considering the damaging effects, and 
resource use in the North would be too small.  
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Table 1: Income and population in the world economy  




Gini (Gi) Overlapping  index 
(Oi) 
Third world (poorer 
than or equal to 
Brazil) 
0.76 1,171  0.494  0.89 
Middle class  0.08  4,609  0.462  0.54 
First world (equal or 
richer than Italy) 
0.16 10,919  0.344  0.25 
World 1  3,031.8  0.659   
Between group Gini      0.449 
(68%) 
 
Within group Gini  
∑isiGiOi 
   0.210 
(32%) 
 
Source: based on Milanovic and Yitzhaki (2002: table 16). 
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Figure 1a: Income per capita, North and South  
 
 
Figure 1b: Total income, North and South  
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Figure 2a: Real capital stock per capita, North and South  
 
 
Figure 2b: Total real capital, North and South  
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Figure 3a: Trade per capita, North and South  
 
Figure 3b: Total trade, North and South  
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Figure 4: CO2 efficiency in production 
 
Figure 5a: CO2 total emission, North and South 
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Figure 6: Price adjustment towards an efficient price pat 
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Figure 7a: CO2 emission per capita, North and South 
 
 
Figure 7b: CO2 accumulated emission per capita, North and South 
 
 